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1 Introduction 
Payment, according to one definition, is “The fulfillment of a promise; the 
performance of an agreement. A delivery of money, or its equivalent in either specific 
property or services, by a debtor to a creditor.”1 Payments can be divided into two main 
categories - payments utilizing paper-based instruments (e.g. cash or checks) and electronic 
payments. Generally, electronic payments involve the transfer of monetary value digitally 
or electronically.2  
The European Commission has described payments as the "oil in the wheels of the 
Internal Market". Therefore, the objective of the Commission is to achieve a Single Euro 
Payment Area, in which citizens and businesses can make cross-border payments as easily, 
safely and efficiently as they can within their own countries and subject to identical 
charges.3 
While there are multiple ways to complete a payment, this thesis will deal with 
electronic payment methods in general and electronic money in particular. It will attempt to 
examine the current state of the electronic money market in Europe while drawing 
comparisons with Japan, a country that is often put forward as an e-money success story. It 
will also try to answer the question whether e-money can have a future in the European 
Union, while focusing on the past and present legislative efforts as well as other factors. 
                                                 
1 As defined in West's Encyclopedia of American Law < http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/payment> last viewed March 6, 2011 
2 Credit transfers and direct debits as well as credit and debit card transactions are examples of electronic 
payments. 
3 EU Commission <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/index_en.htm> last viewed March 6, 2011 
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1.1 E-Money: A Real World Example 
In his article4 Jean J. Luyat details the case of Kozo Matsuoka, a Japanese 
information technology worker who travels regularly between Fukuoka to Tokyo. His cell 
phone is probably the most important item he takes on his trips. This is because it contains 
a contactless integrated circuit (or IC)5 chip programmed with data from three separate 
electronic money issuers. Kozo purchases prepaid electronic funds from Suica, Pasmo and 
Edy6 on a regular basis. He can recharge or top up his prepaid accounts at recharging 
booths, normally found close to public transit stations or convenience stores. The purchase 
of prepaid funds can be recorded directly onto the IC chip in Kozo's phone or on a remote 
server. He commonly purchases between ¥40 000 and ¥60 000 of prepaid e-money each 
month. When he uses the funds the amount that he spends is rarely greater than ¥2 0007 at 
any given time. The average value of electronic money transactions in Japan was ¥7328 in 
fiscal 20089, so Kozo's spending habits are in line with those of the average Japanese. He 
uses the electronic funds for public transport, vending machine purchases, to shop at 
convenience stores and other retail locations. As of March 2009 there were 480 000 
terminals throughout Japan.10 
Kozo can purchase a sandwich or pay for a tax by simply waving his mobile phone in 
front of an IC chip reader. A transaction completed this way takes less than a second, 
which is both expedient and convenient. He uses his Suica and Pasmo accounts to pay for 
bus and train rides in the Tokyo area. The IC chip in his phone opens the automatic entry 
                                                 
4 Luyat (2009), pp 525-526 
5 An IC chip is a tiny integrated circuit that not only stores but also processes information. It can be 
incorporated into payment cards, mobile phones and other devices. Contactless technology allows a reader 
device to communicate with the chip from a distance, without physical contact. 
6 These e-money issuers are among the 8 major e-money issuers surveyed in the Bank of Japan (BOJ) Report 
on E-Money - Developments in Electronic Money in Japan during Fiscal 2008. 
7 The current exchange rate as of 10.03.2011 is ¥115 to the Euro. Source: http://www.xe.com 
8 BOJ Report on E-Money (2009), p 3 
9 Fiscal 2008 runs from April 2008 - March 2009 
10 BOJ (2009), p 2 
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and exit turnstiles, while the ticket cost is subtracted from the prepaid balance with the fare 
calculated based on the length of his trip.  
In other words, the ease and convenience of electronic money have become an 
indispensable element of Kozo's everyday life. Beyond ease and convenience, there are 
other advantages as well. Kozo's Edy account is connected to an airline mileage reward 
program, so he earns mileage points while making purchases. 
1.2 Subject Matter and Research Method 
The example above illustrates that electronic money has grown to become a major 
method of payment in Japan. On the other hand, electronic money in the European Union 
has not been nearly as successful in replacing other types of payment.11 In the EU as a 
whole there are only a limited number of fully licensed electronic money institutions 
(ELMIs) and the e-money volume remains low.12 E-money services continue to be a fairly 
niche product and are used by a small fraction of consumers. The EU Commission's 2008 
proposal for a new directive on electronic money states "electronic money is still far from 
delivering the full potential benefits that were expected".13 At the same time, the 
development of electronic payment services is considered important because it can 
contribute to reduced payment costs and economic growth. 
With the above-mentioned details and the growing importance of electronic payment 
methods providing an incentive, this paper will explore the underlying factors as to why 
electronic money has been languishing as a method of payment in Europe, while it has 
been enjoying its current success in Japan. The European legislative framework will be 
surveyed in attempt to answer the question why the original E-Money Directive14 was 
ineffective in reaching its goals.15 Since Japan is a country that has enjoyed widespread use 
                                                 
11 Acceptance and adoption of e-money in both Japan and Europe will be discussed in Section 2.2 
12 See EC Proposal COM(2008)627 final, p 2 
13 Id. 
14 Directive 2000/46/EC 
15 As evidenced by its repeal and replacement in 2009 by Directive 2009/110/EC and the e-money market not 
meeting expectations. See Section 2.2.1 
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and acceptance of prepaid payment instruments16, the European E-Money Directive will be 
compared with the key legal provisions in Japan pertaining to electronic money.  A 
question to be answered is whether the regulatory differences are responsible for the 
dissimilar prominence of e-money as a payment method in each of the two jurisdictions. 
Additionally, the paper will also analyze whether the adoption of recent legislative 
instruments such as the Payment Services Directive17 and the new E-Money Directive18 
can be successful in their attempt to harmonize the payment services market and to spur the 
growth and wide acceptance of electronic money as a payment medium. 
Existing literature in the form of magazine articles, books, and reports will be used in 
the quest to answer the above questions. Statistics from the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of Japan and other sources will be consulted. Further, the relevant legislative 
instruments will also be referred to and analyzed. 
1.3 Structure 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 attempts to illustrate what e-money is and why it is important as a means of 
payment. Then, it examines statistics from both Europe and Japan in an effort to compare 
the growth trends and adoption rates of e-money in each area. The chapter continues to 
evaluate the various factors, such as payment culture, technology, business strategies and 
legal environment that could account for the success of electronic money or the lack of it. 
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of the regulatory environment on e-money 
development in the European Union. The original E-Money Directive is reviewed in detail. 
The review includes the Directive's background, the reasons for its adoption, its main 
features, and the achieved results weighed against the Directive's goals. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the regulatory problems pertaining to mobile network 
operators in Europe and the issues arising from PayPal's activities as a globally successful 
e-money issuer. 
                                                 
16 See Section 2.3.2 
17 Directive 2007/64/EC 
18 Directive 2009/110/EC 
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Chapter 4 discusses the central features of the Japanese regulatory framework. The 
emphasis in this chapter falls on the Prepaid Card Law, which regulated prepaid 
instruments in Japan for a period of 20 years. The chapter continues with the reasons for 
the Law's repeal and replacement and draws a comparison with the legislative regime in the 
European Union. 
Chapter 5 contains an analysis of the Payment Services Directive and its effect on the 
European payment services market in general and on e-money in particular. Next, the new 
E-Money Directive is reviewed, chiefly with regard to the changes it introduces to the 
prudential framework in the EU. The chapter attempts to draw a comparison between the 
revised regulatory regime in Europe and that of Japan. 
The thesis comes to an end with a summary of the main arguments and conclusions. 
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2 Electronic Money as a Payment Alternative 
The first section of this chapter examines what electronic money actually is and how 
it can be defined. It looks at its advantages and disadvantages. The second section drills 
into the numbers to compare the acceptance and adoption rates of e-money in the European 
Union and Japan. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the factors that are 
accountable for the growth and adoption of e-money as a payment method. 
2.1 E-Money Defined 
Money in general takes on a number of roles in the realm of economic activity. It 
serves several purposes. It is a medium of exchange, because it is widely accepted in 
exchange for goods and services being sold by people. It is a store of value that can be put 
aside and used in the future. Finally it is a unit of account, providing a standard for 
comparing the value of different goods and services. By its nature electronic money 
includes all these functions. It can also be regarded as a cash alternative.19  
The way electronic money works is that a prepaid card or account is first credited 
with electronic units denominated in the currency of the country in which the scheme is 
operating.20 It is also technically possible to store currency in different denominations, and 
some schemes do advertise such services for customers traveling abroad.21 When a 
consumer makes a purchase, value is transferred from the consumer's account to the 
merchant via a retailer terminal or through an online transaction, approximating the manner 
cash is spent. 
                                                 
19 Recital 2 of the original EMD states that electronic money can be considered as an electronic surrogate for 
coins and banknotes 
20 Brindle & Cox (2010), p 267 
21 See for example the Cash Passport service of Travelex at <http://www.cashpassport.com/> last viewed 
April 25, 2011 
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On a worldwide level there is still no unified definition of e-money.  Different people 
and different administrative bodies have categorized and described electronic money in a 
variety of ways.22  
According to the EU Commission electronic money is: 
 
A digital equivalent of cash, stored on an electronic device or remotely at a server. One 
common type of e-money is the 'electronic purse', where users store relatively small amounts 
of money on their payment card or other smart card, to use for making small payments. 23 
 
In other words, stored-value payment instruments can be divided into two groups: 
those that store information on an integrated circuit (IC) chip built into the card and those 
that utilize a remote server as a storage medium. Further, "e-money can also be stored on 
(and used via) mobile phones or in a payment account on the internet". 24 The legal 
definition of electronic money in the EU has evolved after first being set in the original E-
Money Directive25 because it was subsequently amended by the new E-Money Directive.26 
The two directives and the definition of e-money will be discussed in more detail further 
below in the paper.27 
The Consumer Advisory Board of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States has 
described e-money as money that moves electronically. It primarily takes the form of card-
based and computer-based products (often referred to as stored-value cards and network 
money, respectively) that are independent of a bank account. Electronic money can be used 
at a point of sale or directly in a person-to-person transaction without the intervention of an 
                                                 
22 Id.  
23 EU Commission < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/emoney/index_en.htm> last viewed 
March 6, 2011 
24 Id. 
25 Directive 2000/46/EC, Article 1(3)(b) 
26 Directive 2009/110/EC, Article 2(2) 
27 See Sections 3.2 and 4.2 
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outside entity. It can be moved around or spent through telephone lines or computer 
networks.28 
Japan has taken a different approach altogether. It has sidestepped the question as to 
what is electronic money. Instead, it has elected to regulate prepaid vouchers, which could 
be either electronic or paper based.29 It was not until recently that server-type prepayments 
were also grouped together with prepaid vouchers.30 
2.1.1 Advantages of E-Money 
Having a suitable method of payment is vital to the development of business activity 
and electronic money is a method of payment that can be used in both online and offline 
settings. The development of trade and business activity can in turn lead to increased 
investments, new employment opportunities, enhanced competitiveness and economic 
growth in general.31 In other words, a quick and convenient payment medium such as 
electronic money can be advantageous by facilitating commerce at the retail level since 
consumers would be more likely to make a purchase if the transaction can be completed in 
a quick, easy and convenient way. This in turn will give rise to further economic benefits. 
Electronic money is deemed beneficial for multiple other reasons as well. 
First of all, e-money can offer ease of use and simplicity not available with other 
payment methods. This was illustrated above in the case of Kozo Matsuoka. The ability to 
make a payment without entering PIN numbers and security codes can speed up both 
online and offline transaction and lead to increased trading volume and the introduction of 
new products and services. In the field of mobile commerce, for instance, GSM Europe 
contends that the take-up of new, innovative products and services is dependent upon the 
availability of simple payment mechanisms. Additionally, pre-payment options have 
                                                 
28 Yang (2005) 
29 See generally Luyat (2009) 
30 See Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu (2009) 
31 See Recital 2 of Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce. 
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already played a key role in stimulating new mobile services and will be vital to the success 
of new 3G content offerings.32 
Second, electronic money is looked upon as a payment medium that is particularly 
suitable for micropayments33 or where the use of credit or debit cards can be cumbersome 
or expensive. Not only can card transactions be difficult for consumers and merchants to 
complete, but the fees the merchant incurs can sometimes add up to more than the purchase 
amount itself. Sellers also have to deal with chargebacks34 eating into their profits. In this 
way, card fees pose a threat to the development of online and mobile commerce.35 
Economists consider transaction costs as a form of economic friction - the decrease of 
economic friction will result in greater productivity.36 Having a low cost payment method 
will enable vendors to offer low-ticket items, which could be especially beneficial to 
industries such as publishing, software and online gaming. 
Third, e-money can be useful in distance selling commerce (online and mobile) by 
enabling users who are unable or unwilling to use credit or debit cards to complete 
purchase. Users may be reluctant to use credit/debit cards because they do not want to 
divulge their account details37, for example. Or they may not be able to obtain a 
credit/debit card due to a lack of good credit history or a banking relationship. Persons 
under 18 are significant consumers of products and services purchased through online or 
mobile channels. Yet, they may not be able to obtain certain bank cards.38 Furthermore, 
unbanked consumers in general can benefit if available e-money solutions offered the 
ability to transfer funds from person to person, as a substitute to using cash. This can be of 
                                                 
32 GSME Response to Commission E-Money Consultation, (2004), p 2 
33 An electronic transaction consisting of the transfer of a very small sum of money. See 
<http://www.investorwords.com/3052/micropayment.html> last viewed April 25, 2011 
34 A chargeback is when a buyer reverses a credit card payment for any reason, for example claiming that the 
payment was fraudulently made, dissatisfaction with the goods and services received, etc. 
35 Tripunitara & Messerges (2007), p 104 
36 Baddeley (2004), p 239 
37 By using a prepaid payment instruments consumers do not share bank account, credit or debit card details 
with the merchant. This reduces the risk of fraud, since only the prepaid funds are at risk. 
38 Mansour 2007, p 2 
 9
particular significance in developing countries where the penetration of banking services is 
low.39 
Lastly, it is expected that electronic money will have the capacity to reduce the 
production, storage and usage costs of cash (bank notes and coins) in the same way that 
convertible paper currencies reduced these costs for commodity based money (e.g. gold 
and silver). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that governments will have a more than a limited 
involvement in the issuance of e-money.40 
2.1.2 Disadvantages of E-Money 
Despite its benefits, e-money has certain limitations. Regular cash does not 
automatically convert into e-money. The e-money user needs to find a recharging machine 
or a sales clerk with a POS terminal and either one has to be specific to the brand of e-
money involved.41 A server-based account (such as PayPal) also requires extra steps to be 
funded. Subsequently, the user needs to remain aware of how much value remains on the 
prepaid account to avoid running out of funds at an inconvenient moment. One type of e-
money cannot usually be converted into another and each one has its own peculiarities.42 
One of the biggest drawbacks of electronic money is that it is not universally 
accepted. It is distinct from fiat money because it is not considered legal tender and as a 
result, creditors are not obligated to accept it as a payment (while they cannot object to a 
payment in legal tender).43 The ability to accept prepaid cards, for example, depends on the 
merchant's participation in the relevant card scheme. In the United Kingdom major card 
issuers (such as MasterCard and Visa) now provide prepaid cards that are branded with the 
logos of the card scheme and the issuer.44 However, only merchants having a merchant 
                                                 
39 This is demonstrated by the success of services such as M-PESA in Kenya, which is a mobile phone-based 
money transfer service. In three years, since 2007, it has attracted over 9.5 million customers, in a country 
with only 8.4 million bank accounts. For further details see: Tarazi & Breloff (2010) 
40 Baddeley (2004), p 241 
41 Mainwaring et al. (2008), p 23  
42 Id. 
43 Baddeley (2004), p 241 
44 Brindle & Cox (2010), p 266 
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agreement with the ability to accept cards belonging to the card scheme can receive 
payments with these prepaid cards. Most other prepaid card schemes belong to the category 
of proprietary closed systems45 and can be used, for instance, only for public transport or 
on university campuses.46 As their electronic money gains acceptance, issuers may begin 
marketing their e-money services for other uses. This is a trend seen in Japan, where 
retailer companies that initially focused on their own company group, began promoting 
electronic money use outside of it.47 
Another argument is that while electronic money has been advertised as a solution for 
privacy conscious consumers most often that is not the case. An e-money scheme can be 
either unaccounted - meaning that the electronic money circulates without transactions 
being recorded - or accounted. If a scheme is operating on an accounted basis it provides 
customers with a way to check their transaction history, online or otherwise.48 Most e-
money schemes, however, do not provide such anonymity. 
Nonetheless, one would think that the pros of electronic money outweigh its cons and 
it should prove to be a viable payment option both online and offline. To further explore 
this, let us look at the statistics regarding e-money usage in the European Union and Japan. 
2.2 Acceptance and Adoption - A Look at the Numbers 
2.2.1 Europe 
The role of electronic money remains marginal in the EU. It has not undergone the 
rapid growth that was originally foreseen despite its benefits over other types of payment 
methods.49 There has been only a modest increase in the use of e-money over the years. 
The total value of outstanding electronic money balances was estimated at around 0.1% of 
banknotes and coins in circulation in December 2007, an increase of 0.04% from December 
                                                 
45 A closed system is one where the holder of electronic money can purchase goods and services only from 
the issuer. In an open system, goods and services can be purchased from a number of participating merchants. 
46 Brindle & Cox (2010), p 266 
47 BOJ Report on E-Money (2009), p 3 
48 Brindle & Cox (2010), p 267 
49 ECB Electronic Money Institutions (2008), p 9 
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2000.50  In 2008 there was a manifold increase in software-based51 e-money and as a result, 
total outstanding e-money measured as percentage against total outstanding currency 
jumped to 0.16%.52 A more telling indicator though of the general acceptance of electronic 
money is the number of transactions. The number of e-money transactions as percentage of 
all non-cash payments in the euro area was 0.3% in 2000, 0.8% in 2007 and 1.5% in 
200953, exhibiting a trend similar to that of the outstanding e-money balances.  The e-
money market was growing in absolute terms, yet as a proportion of all cashless payments 
it remained stable between 2002 and 2007.54 It appears that the growth rate has picked up 
in recent years but still the percentages are still exceptionally small. 
The number of e-money issuers in Europe has trended up as well. Still, there are 
relatively few issuers using the passporting provisions of the E-Money Directive. The EMD 
Evaluation revealed there were 9 licensed ELMIs in 5 EU Member States with three 
additional in Norway. 72 entities in 7 Member States were registered as operating under a 
waiver of which 57 were found in the UK and the Czech Republic. 55 E-money was issued 
by traditional credit institutions in at least 15 Member States.56 By 2007 it was estimated 
that there were 24 licensed e-money issuers in the EU in 7 Member States. 13 of those were 
based in the UK. The number of institutions operating under a waiver had grown to 94. 
Again, the Czech Republic and the UK accounted for the bulk of them - 77 altogether. As 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Refers to e-money products accessed through a computer that transfer electronic value over 
telecommunication networks such as the Internet. 
52 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), <http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss95.htm> last viewed April 1, 2011  
53 ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
<http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=169.PSS.A.U2.F000.IEM.Z00Z.NP.X0.20.Z0Z.Z> 
last viewed March 31, 2011 
54 Id. 
55 The Evaluation Partnership (TEP), Evaluation of the E-Money Directive (2000/46/EC) Final Report 
(2006), p 4, hereafter referred to as TEP Final Report 
56 Id., p 38 
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regards institutions utilizing the so called "European Passport" was assessed at no more 
than 10, with most of those based in the UK.57 
The above numbers illustrate that there is an increasing interest in the European 
market for electronic money. Even though e-money usage can currently be labeled as 
insignificant compared to other payment methods it has begun growing at a faster pace. 
The number of ELMIs has been increasing as well, which could mean e-money could be on 
its way to fulfill its promise. Nevertheless, there are a number of factors that can be 
responsible for the take-up and development of electronic money. These will be dealt with 
in the next section. But first, let us compare the situation in the European e-money market 
with that of Japan. 
2.2.2 Japan 
Japan is often cited as a success story for electronic money. In fact, it is only second to 
Hong Kong in adopting stored-value digital payments for everyday transactions.58 
Moreover, e-money in Japan continues to exhibit remarkable growth. Both the total volume 
and value of transactions settled with electronic money in 2008 increased by 40% 
compared with the previous fiscal year.59 
The statistics reported by the Bank of Japan, however, do not track software-based e-
money. Further, the BOJ figures are not, for most part, directly comparable with those 
provided by the ECB. Even so, the numbers for hardware-based products or prepaid cards 
give us a sufficient enough overview of the widespread use and growth of the e-money in 
Japan. 
The value of outstanding electronic money as a percentage of coins and banknotes in 
circulation was comparable to that in Europe. E-money represented 0.10% of total cash in 
circulation in March 2008 and 0.11% a year later.60 This shows that even in Japan the 
amount of outstanding electronic money is significantly less that the amount of outstanding 
                                                 
57 ECB Electronic Money Institutions (2008), p 10 
58 Mainwaring et al. (2008), p 21 
59 BOJ (2009), p 3 
60 BOJ (2009), p 6 
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cash. Nevertheless, in a country with a population of 127 million61 there were 105 million 
e-money cards issued by the end of March 2009 (representing a year over year increase of 
30.3%). E-money accounts built into mobile phones represented 12 million of the above 
number.62  To put these numbers in perspective there were 410 million debit cards issued 
as of December 2008 and 293 million credit cards as of fiscal year 2006. These figures 
show the significant penetration of electronic money instruments. What is more, in Japan 
there are 500 or so smart card services63 and the number of terminals where e-money is 
accepted has also grown rapidly, reaching 480 000 in March 2009, with a year over year 
growth of 34%.64 
The statistics that really illustrate the widespread usage of e-money in Japan are those 
that show the number and value of transactions for different card payment instruments. 
While electronic money remains a payment method used mostly for small amounts - the 
average transaction value was ¥732 - the total value of settled transactions surpassed that of 
debit cards in fiscal 2008.65 While credit cards were responsible for the bulk of card 
transactions in Japan or 75%, e-money represented approximately 18% of the total number 
of card transactions, a noteworthy achievement unto itself. In fact, the number of e-money 
transactions was greater than the volume of debit card purchases and ATM withdrawals 
combined.66 In 2009 by contrast, card transactions in Europe accounted for 38.4% of all 
non-cash payments and electronic money payments for 1.1%.67 Stated differently, the 
number of e-money transactions equaled only about 2.9% of the volume of card 
transactions. 
                                                 
61 Id., supra note 60, BIS 
62 BOJ (2009), p 2 
63 The Economist (2007), A Cash Call 
64 BOJ (2009), p 2 
65 Id., p 8 
66 Id. 
67 ECB Statistical Data Warehouse, < http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=1000001441> last viewed 
April 2, 2011 
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A development that is seen in Japan and not yet encountered in Europe is the spread 
of contactless credit cards, which do not require authorization by signature or PIN.68 Their 
use is similar to that of prepaid electronic money and they are sometimes referred to as 
"post-pay electronic money".69 This goes to show that technology is helping credit cards to 
compete with electronic money. Other than the regulatory environment, technology is but 
one of the factors responsible for the varying degree of popularity and relative importance 
of various payment methods in different jurisdictions. These factors will be addressed in 
the next section. 
2.3 Factors Responsible for the Growth and Adoption of E-Money 
2.3.1 Payment Culture 
It has been stated that the rapid success of e-money in Japan is partly due to "cultural 
attitudes and dense urban living".70 It is a given that the payment culture and the payment 
habits of consumers in any country predetermine to a certain degree the type of payment 
methods that are used. Further, in order for consumers to change their payment behavior 
they would need to see the clear benefits of a new payment method - such as greater 
convenience, better security, privacy, etc. 
One of the main differences between Japan and Europe is that the Japanese have a 
preference for cash payments71, while European consumers tend to use debit and credit 
cards more often and for smaller transactions72. A telling fact is that in 2009, the 
outstanding currency in circulation outside of banks was €5 02673 per person in Japan, 
                                                 
68 BOJ (2009), p 7 
69 Id. 
70 Halpin and Moore (2009), p 567 
71 See Mann (2002), p 1061 
72 A comparison of ECB and BOJ figures reveals that on average credit and debit card transactions in Japan 
involve greater amounts than those in Europe. 
73 ¥601 738 equals €5026 at an exchange rate of ¥119.72/€1 as of April 2, 2011 
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while only €2 339 per person in the Euro Area, with per capita GDP being in a similar 
range.74  
Taking into account that electronic money is a product that is considered a surrogate 
for coins and banknotes75 and the Japanese predilection for cash it may be logical that 
stored-value cards will have a wider use in Japan and will experience faster growth than 
elsewhere. Moreover, Japan is a country with little street crime, so it is safe for Japanese 
adults to carry large amounts of cash, which they tend to do.76 So, if for the Japanese it is 
common to carry cash amounts greater than ¥10 00077, it may come naturally to hold 
prepaid electronic instruments of similar amounts.78 
It may also be argued that debit cards can be regarded as a substitute for cash to a 
degree.79 Debit cards were adopted comparatively late in Japan80 and as illustrated above81 
debit card usage represents only a small share of card transactions. On the other hand, 
credit card payments have their own peculiarities.82 The Japanese preference for cash 
payments and the relative lack of payment substitutes in the form of card payments may 
have been a contributing factor to the growth and spread of e-money. 
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In contrast, debit cards are well established as a payment method in Europe. In 2009 
cards with a debit function represented 66.4% of all payment cards in the EU.83 Survey 
data show that while consumers still prefer to pay with cash for small amounts, they tend to 
reach for their cards as the value of the transaction increases. The younger the consumer, 
the more likely he or she is to use a payment card instead of cash.84 Generally, there is a 
longstanding familiarity and trust associated with card use in the EU, which may help 
explain the lagging market for e-money. It remains to be seen whether consumer 
perceptions and payment habits will change in the future. 
2.3.2 Technology 
Technological developments are really important for the adoption of a payment 
method such as electronic money, because technology will affect the convenience and 
security of a payment method, attributes which in turn are necessary to gain consumer trust. 
For merchants and payment system distributors cost is the all-important factor. However, 
better security (in the form of reduced fraud potential), increased convenience (less time 
and labor consuming) and wider consumer acceptance will all result in lower costs. 
One feature that is characteristic of e-money payments in Japan is the use of 
contactless payments via technologies such as NFC.85 Contactless payment provides 
consumers speed and convenience absent in cash transaction with banknotes and coins. An 
electronic money payment operation can be completed in a fraction of a second.86 The 
integration of payment functions into mobile phones (or ketai as their known in Japan) 
provides added convenience. This integration makes carrying additional payment cards 
redundant as many handsets take on the functions of cash, keys, credit cards and ID.87 
Moreover, the Japanese generally consider their phones secure and the handsets can be 
locked remotely in the event of loss or theft to protect the cash, credit and information on 
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them.88 Contactless and NFC technology along with using mobile phones as payment 
instruments are only at a trial stage in Europe. There has been interest in NFC payments 
within the UK and trials conducted by the mobile operator O2 and the e-money issuer 
sQuid.89 Currently, there are also efforts by Visa Europe and Wireless Dynamics Inc. to 
bring NFC payments to iPhone users. There are ongoing trials in Turkey and the UK and 
Visa Europe intends to engage its member banks and partner mobile operators in Italy, 
France, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland to further commercialize the service.90 It remains to 
be seen whether these schemes will gain widespread consumer acceptance. 
2.3.3 Business Strategies 
It appears that the required prerequisites for an electronic money scheme to be 
successful are a sound business model and filling a niche that meets the needs of both 
consumers and merchants.  
For example, PayPal is arguably the most successful online payment service in the 
world. It was founded in the US as a company in 1998 and has grown rapidly since and 
expanded throughout the world.91 PayPal's growth was initially based on filling a market 
niche as it concentrated on person to person (P2P) payments and payments in connection 
with online auctions.92 The United States is a country where checks are widely used for 
payments and there is no widely accessible payment medium for person to person (P2P) 
electronic payments.93 PayPal was able to fill that gap by allowing its account holders to 
send money via the internet, email, telephone or text message without sharing financial 
information.94  
PayPal's growth was also linked to the success of eBay since it positioned itself as a 
convenient payment method for online auctions. EBay actually purchased PayPal in 
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2002.95 PayPal has brought to consumers and merchants a flexible payment platform that 
allows integration into online auctions and web storefronts. This platform allows sellers to 
automatically fill in the payment order for the buyer and the payee is immediately notified 
once a payment is made. Further, PayPal also offers buying protection.96 
PayPal derives its revenues from fees charged to merchants for receiving payments 
and from surcharges on currency conversions. It does not charge for the issuance or 
redemption of electronic funds, even though some forms of funds withdrawal from a 
PayPal account may incur a fee.97 
By contrast, the success of stored-value cards in Japan comes from the 
implementation of e-money schemes by retailers and railway companies, not financial 
institutions.98 These issuers do not normally generate income from payment transactions. 
Stored-value cards, however, do help improve the issuers' main business by creating 
convenience and efficiency.99 
For example, Suica has its origins as a train fare card for the JR East railway in Japan. 
It was implemented as a way to reduce ticket collector costs and increase efficiency at the 
turnstile.100 Suica came into use in 2001 but it was not until 2004 that its wider payment 
function was launched. Railroad commuting is widely used in the densely populated urban 
areas in Japan and by adding a payment function to fare cards, the railways merely 
extended the cards' functionality.101 Moreover, the railway companies in Japan often serve 
as tenants and developers of the areas surrounding train stations. This gives them the 
leverage to extend the acceptance of their payment cards to stores and vending machines in 
those areas.102  
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In a similar fashion, Japanese retail chains such as the Aeon group and others 
instituted stored-value cards in order to gather customer data and strengthen customer 
relationships.103 The BOJ E-Money Report indicates that retailer companies, initially only 
focusing on providing e-money services within their group companies, began promoting 
usage outside their group.104 Additionally, vending machine operators started to accept 
multiple brands of electronic money.105 
It becomes clear that electronic money can be successful when it plays a synergistic 
role to business activities outside the payment arena. This is demonstrated by the success of 
PayPal as payment method for online auctions and the growth of e-money in Japan when 
introduced by railways and retailer chains. 
2.3.4 Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory environment plays a crucial role in the development of any market 
sector. Companies need stability and certainty from a legal standpoint to be able to develop 
their business strategies. Regulation brings with it certain overheads, such as compliance 
costs and regulatory hurdles for businesses to overcome. These need to be factored into the 
business models of electronic money issuers. Therefore, with regard to electronic money, 
first there is a need for clarity where and to which businesses e-money regulation applies. 
Second, the regulatory requirements need to be proportionate to the risks they attempt to 
mediate. There is a fine line between necessary regulation in the interest of consumer 
protection and financial system stability, and regulation that is too stringent and stifles 
business growth and innovation.  
Furthermore, as far as the European market is concerned, there is a need for 
consistency between the various jurisdictions. Consistency is needed if the objective is to 
achieve a single European market for financial services in general and e-money in 
particular, a market facilitating the provision of cross-border payment services. Differing 
prudential requirements between jurisdictions are a consideration that may weigh on an e-
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money issuer's decision whether or not to expand to a more regulated jurisdiction. A 
decision not to expand can affect the economic viability of its money issuing business by 
hampering the achievement of economies of scale that can be attained by operating in more 
than one jurisdiction.106 
2.3.5 Other Considerations 
For a payment method to be successful, however, it is also necessary that it reaches 
critical mass, wide acceptance and economies of scale. Undoubtedly, PayPal had a helping 
hand from eBay's popularity. In Japan, however, there were other factors at play that 
contributed to the success of e-money. Most importantly, standardization and accessibility 
of technologies have had a crucial role.107 The contactless payment technology that has 
made a most vital contribution to this success is called FeliCa or Felicity Card.108 It was 
developed by FeliCa Networks, a subsidiary of Sony and NTT DoCoMo (a primary MNO 
in Japan).109 This technology was licensed to ensure compatibility between services and 
operators and then subsequent cooperation between operators and manufacturers of handset 
equipment.110 In addition, FeliCa provided integrated turnkey solutions and made 
investments amounting to €40,000,000 to ensure retailers had the ability to read mobile 
devices.111 
As a point of contrast, the early development of e-money in Europe was plagued by 
technological incompatibilities and competition between payment providers that hindered 
user acceptance. The case of Chipknip and Chipper illustrates that. The two companies 
were competing providers of smart card payment technologies that were launched in the 
Netherlands in the early 1990s.112 The two systems were not compatible with each other. 
Consumer usage was minimal and remained low even after Chipper International decided 
                                                 
106 ECB Electronic Money Institutions (2008), p 31 
107 Halpin and Moore (2009), p 567 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Abrazhevich, et al. (2009), p 413 
 21
to discontinue operations in the Dutch markets and merged with Chipknip.113 In 2004, only 
127 million transactions were made with Chipknip, compared to 1.25 billion made with 
debit cards.114 
There was, however, an additional important factor for the Japanese success story in 
the e-money sphere and namely, the relaxation of financial rules allowing non-banks to 
provide financial services.115 This only confirms that the regulatory environment has an 
essential part to play, a part to be examined in greater detail in the chapters that follow. 
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3 Regulatory Environment in the EU 
This chapter will explore and analyze the legislative regime in the European Union. 
Its first section contains a detailed analysis of the original E-Money Directive, which was 
instrumental in establishing the legal framework for electronic money in the EU. The 
second section of the chapter examines the issues arising from the application of the 
Directive to certain categories of e-money issuers such as mobile network operators 
(MNOs). The chapter closes with a case study of PayPal - a prominent e-money institution 
- that has been able to operate successfully in multiple jurisdictions. 
3.1 Original E-Money Directive 
3.1.1 Background 
In contrast to other countries, such as the USA and Japan, European central banks 
began advocating in-depth regulation of e-money early on. In a 1994 report, the European 
Monetary Institute (EMI)116 urged that only credit institutions be allowed to issue e-
money.117 The EU Commission had a different view and proposed a Directive on 
Electronic Money Institutions in an effort to prevent the formation of a fragmented 
regulatory framework for e-money at the national level that could prove harmful to the 
internal market and restrict competition and innovation in the payment sector.118 Some of 
the Commissions objectives with the proposed directive were: to facilitate the development 
of e-commerce, to create legal certainty, to encourage new market entrants (non-banks), 
and to stimulate competition and e-money product innovations.119 
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The European Central Bank had substantial objections120 and put forward a number 
of requirements in its 1998 Report on Electronic Money. The ECB had the following 
concerns: impact of e-money on monetary policy, protection of customers and merchants, 
efficient functioning of payment systems, stability of financial markets, protection against 
criminal abuse, among others.121 The report presented requirements for prudential 
supervision, solid and transparent legal arrangements, technical security, protection against 
criminal abuse, monetary statistics reporting, redeemability of e-money at par value, and 
ability of central banks to impose reserve requirements on e-money issuers.122 Further, the 
ECB reiterated the position of the EMI's 1994 Report that it is preferable to limit the 
issuance of e-money to credit institutions.123 
The E-Money Directive was finally adopted in September of 2000 and the 
implementation deadline was set for not later than 27 April 2002.124 It was one of the first 
directives adopted in the field of payment systems.125 It took, however, more than two 
years of protracted negotiations between the various stakeholders, and chief among them 
were the European Commission, the central banks of the members states and the European 
Central Bank (ECB).126 In the end, consumer protection127 and safeguarding the integrity 
and stability of the financial system128 were among the main goals behind Directive's 
adoption. The advocates of better consumer protection succeeded in implementing the 
stricter provisions they wanted. Most of the ECB's proposals were incorporated into the 
final version of the Directive.129 
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The Directive as adopted only called for minimum harmonization and differences in 
the implementation at the national level arose.130  Member States were given considerable 
latitude in transposing the main principles of the Directive, more so than other similar legal 
instruments.131 Member States had the option to waive some or all of the provisions of the 
E-Money Directive.132 However, if an e-money institution operated under a waiver, its 
registration could not be passported to other EU countries.133 
3.1.2 Central Features 
In contrast to some countries outside of the EU, such as Australia, the United States 
and Japan, the EU did limit the issuance of electronic money to banking or similarly 
regulated institutions.134 There is a common agreement among European policy analysts 
that issuing electronic currency is comparable to taking bank deposits.135 The EMD creates 
a special category of a credit institution or "electronic money institution"136 that is subject 
to special regulatory provisions. In this way, issuers of electronic money who have 
obtained the appropriate authorization in one Member State can in effect operate 
throughout the singe market, possessing a so-called single passport. This was intended to 
foster the cross-border provision of electronic money services. 137 
The evaluation of the E-Money Directive conducted by external consultants for the 
European Commission and the DG Internal Market observed significant differences in the 
national rules implementing the Directive. These differences could be observed primarily 
in three main areas: first, the implementation of the waiver; second, the interpretation of the 
definition, scope and applicability, and the existence or not of a customized set of rules 
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regarding management, administrative and accounting procedures, internal control 
mechanisms, etc.138 
3.1.3 Analysis of Definitions 
3.1.3.1 Definition of E-Money 
The E-Money Directive defined electronic money as:  
 
Monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is: (i) stored on an electronic 
device; (ii) issued on receipt of funds of an amount not less in value than the monetary value 
issued; (iii) accepted as means of payment by undertakings other than the issuer.139  
 
There were several problems with this definition. Firstly, while the EMD was 
attempting to be technologically neutral in (i), this has resulted in an ambiguity and 
different interpretations. The term electronic device was not defined in the directive, and as 
a result it could include a wide range of devices. At the time of adoption, the most common 
applications of e-money were either smart cards with a built-in IC chip or a software wallet 
on the holder's PC.140 If we take debit cards, for example, their monetary value is not stored 
on an electronic device or on the card itself, and whereas they serve as a means of payment 
they are not covered by the definition of e-money.141 E-money was assumed to be 
analogous to notes and coins in the physical word and as such payment had to take place by 
physical transfer of monetary units. The Directive envisaged that the electronic funds will 
be in the physical possession of the user.142 With the development of technology and mass 
communications, it became possible for payment services providers to remotely hold the 
customers' money, and simply reassign the funds to the merchant's account at the time of 
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payment.143 Therefore, a point of contention was whether such payment services involved 
value "stored on an electronic device" and consequently, whether the EMD applied. This 
was of particular importance to mobile telephony providers as will be illustrated later on in 
this paper. 
Secondly, part (ii) of the e-money definition led to varying national 
implementations.144 This part, which does not allow issuance of e-money for payment less 
than its value, was added on the initiative of the ECB to prevent e-money institutions from 
issuing e-money at a discount and creating artificial value and in such a way potentially 
expanding the money supply in an uncontrollable way.145 The UK authorities, for example, 
had expressed concern that this provision would legalize rather than inhibit credit creation 
by e-money institutions.146 Other member states were worried that the inclusion of the 
clause would allow147 e-money issued at a discount to fall outside the definition of 
electronic money and not be covered by the Directive. As a result, seven member states 
omitted the part stating "of an amount not less in value", including it instead as a 
substantive clause or requirement for e-money issuers.148 
Thirdly, criterion (iii) of the definition, whereby e-money "is accepted as a means of 
payment by undertakings other than the issuer" was also subject to interpretation and 
clarification. For example, Belgium replaced "means of payment" with "an instrument of 
payment" for better clarity; Germany specified that e-money is accepted as a means of 
payment without being legal tender. Most significantly, Estonian law stipulated that e-
money should be accepted by at least one undertaking other than the issuer, and it must 
have a direct creditor/debtor relationship with customer. The goal of this was to make clear 
                                                 
143 Reed (2007), p 281 
144 TEP Final Report (2006), p 48 
145 Id. 
146 Malte (2002), p 3 
147 TEP Final Report (2006), p 48 
148 Id. 
 27
whether prepaid products provided by mobile operators should be regarded as electronic 
money.149 
With consumer protection in mind some countries established a general maximum 
amount or purse limit that each e-money account or device could hold. This was intended 
to limit the potential losses to customers in the event the issuer became insolvent.150 
Additionally, certain member states introduced other, more general changes to the 
definition of e-money. These commonly added additional criteria with the intention to 
further clarify the definition.151 These varying implementations could not have helped the 
emergence of a single market for e-money payment services. It was pointed out that the 
purse limit, for example, was likely to have impact market development in countries where 
it was set at a low level. As a result, at least one company from such a country was 
considering obtaining a license elsewhere.152 
3.1.3.2 Definition of Electronic Money Institutions 
As discussed, electronic money institutions are a subcategory of credit institutions.153 
Nevertheless some sources have indicated that Member States have, in fact, adopted two 
separate approaches in defining ELMIs - one approach regards them as a subcategory of 
credit institutions and the other as a separate category of organization with a license to 
issue e-money. The Evaluation of the E-Money Directive concluded that these differences 
were primarily semantic.154 Differences did exist, however, in the manner rules pertinent to 
banks were applied to ELMIs. In most EU countries separate rules for e-money institutions 
did not exist, and they were subject to the rules applicable to traditional credit 
institutions.155 This, on the other hand, may have resulted in rules that are two burdensome 
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for the successful development of the e-money market. In Germany, for instance, ELMIs 
are treated just like banks, having to submit monthly balance sheets to the Bundesbank. 
Additionally, the managing directors of an ELMI were required to have previous 
experience in leading a bank. Last but not least, an application for an ELMI license was to 
be accompanied by ex ante proof of profitability of the business model.156 
Such strict rules may have stifled the development of an emerging e-money market 
dependent on technological innovation. Some stakeholders have even considered the rules 
and regulations applicable to ELMIs in the UK as burdensome. This is so even while a 
"specialist sourcebook" or lighter and more targeted regulations have been set up in the UK 
for ELMIs as a result of continued dialog between the competent authorities and the 
industry.157 
3.1.4 Prudential Framework 
The EMD created a legal framework that allowed non-banks to become e-money 
issuers by being treated as a subcategory of credit institutions. Both types of entities are 
allowed to issue e-money and it was assumed that this approach will encourage competition 
by permitting new non-bank market entrants into the market.158 In order to maintain a level 
playing field different prudential requirements applied. While the supervisory regime for 
ELMIs was made lighter notably in the area of reduced initial capital requirements and the 
non-applicability of certain rules relevant to credit institutions, this was compensated by 
restrictions in other areas, such as restriction on business activities, limitation on 
investments and a requirement outstanding e-money to be backed at all times by liquid 
assets.159 In essence, the pillars of the regulatory framework set up by the EMD are the 
following five areas: the capital and reserve requirements, the limitations on activities, the 
limitations on investments, redeemability of electronic money and the principles of sound 
and prudent operations. 
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When conducting the Evaluation of the E-Money Directive the consultants reviewed 
how the above requirements were implemented at the national level and queried national 
authorities, non-bank money issuers, banks and mobile network operators (MNOs) as to 
their opinions regarding the suitability of the regulations. 
3.1.4.1 Limitations on Activities 
Firstly, an important restriction on e-money issuers is that they are not allowed to 
engage in business activities that are not closely related to the issuance and administration 
of e-money. The EMD specifically prevents ELMIs from granting credit.160 Further, they 
are not allowed to have holdings in undertakings engaging in business activities extraneous 
to e-money issuance.161 
National authorities from all member states have reported that the restrictions on 
activities have been imposed without changes.162 While surveyed banks agreed that the 
conditions are appropriate in order to ensure stability of the payment systems, both e-
money issuers and MNOs thought the restrictions should be relaxed. E-money issuers had 
expressed concern that the inability to grant credit would place them at a disadvantage. The 
feedback of MNOs was that the conditions were too restrictive and discouraged the 
development of the mobile sector, in effect preventing mobile operators from issuing e-
money.163 There was a general apprehension that new entrants would be discouraged, 
competition restricted and innovation hindered. 
3.1.4.2 Capital and Reserve Requirements 
Secondly, ELMIs are required to have not less than €1 million of own initial capital. 
Further, the own funds of money issuers should not fall below that amount.164 Another 
important requirement relative to reserves is that the own funds of ELMIs must be at least 
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2% of the aggregate e-money issued at all times.165 For instance, if an issuer maintains only 
the minimum €1 million own capital, it can issue a maximum of €50 million of e-money. 
Some Member States had chosen to increase the initial capital requirement from €1 
million to €1.2 million in Hungary, €2.2 million in France and €3 million in Greece.166 
Even the €1.0 million capital requirement was last viewed as too high by the majority of 
non-banks and MNOs surveyed as well as some national authorities. The main argument 
was that the requirements were not proportionate to the risks.167 Some of the concerns were 
that small e-money issuers could have difficulties transitioning to fully fledged ELMIs and 
the use and development of e-money could be impacted.168 
3.1.4.3 Limitations on Investments 
Thirdly, e-money issuers are obligated to maintain a 100% float, which means that 
their investments cannot amount to less than the financial liabilities related to electronic 
money.169 Additionally, these investments have to be in highly liquid, low risk assets.170 
The limitations on investments were transposed uniformly across the member states 
with some differences in the details, in particular with regard to Article 5(4) EMD, stating 
that Member States shall impose "appropriate limitations" on the market risks ELMIs may 
incur from the permitted investments.171 In the stakeholder survey there was again a clear 
division between the responses of banks and those of ELMIs and MNOs. Banks believed 
that the current limitations are appropriate, while non-bank e-money issuers and MNOs 
held that the limitations are two restrictive, even more so than those imposed on banks. 
There was a call for more flexibility. It was also suggested that the restrictions created 
unnecessary administrative costs and limited the development of the market.172  
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3.1.4.4 Redeemability 
Fourthly, the EMD stipulates that e-money must be redeemable at par value free of 
charges other than those strictly necessary to carry out the operation. The minimum 
threshold for redemption cannot exceed €10.173  
With regard to redeemability, all Member States implemented the obligation for the 
issuer to redeem e-money at par value and free of charges other than those strictly 
necessary to carry out the operation. Several countries chose to lower the minimum 
threshold for redemption to as low as €2 in the case of Hungary.174 In the conducted survey 
both banks and national authorities agreed that that the redeemability requirement was 
appropriate. Non-bank e-money issuers expressed a concern that the requirement could 
pose problems, for example with gift vouchers and corporate incentive products. All of the 
queried MNOs stated that redeemability is inappropriate in the context of mobile operators, 
too complex in practice and associated with high administrative costs.175 
3.1.4.5 Sound and Prudent Operations 
Last but not least, the Directive contains guidelines as to the sound and prudent 
operation of e-money institutions. 176 They involve far-reaching regulations similar to those 
applicable to the banking sector and include topics such as the reputation and experience of 
management, sound administrative and accounting procedures, prudent supervision and 
internal control.177 
When it comes to sound and prudent operations, as discussed in 3.2.3 above there 
were differences in the national implementations with regards to how bank rules applied to 
electronic money issuers. It was suggested that strict rules, such as instituted in Germany, 
for instance, may have stifled the development of the emerging e-money market dependent 
on technological innovation. The Evaluation of the EMD concluded that the application of 
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the same set of rules to ELMIs as to traditional credit institutions may not sufficiently 
reflect the specific risks resulting from the activities of e-money issuers. Customized sets of 
rules such as the "specialist sourcebook" in the UK appeared to be more appropriate and 
encouraged competition and new market participants.178 
3.1.4.6 Waiver Regime 
Under the waiver regime member states were allowed to waive the application of 
some or all of the EMD's provisions to electronic money institutions. In order for an e-
money issuer to qualify for a waiver the following conditions should be met: the maximum 
storage amount or purse limit should not exceed €150 and either a) total e-money float size 
of the institution does not usually exceed €5 million and never exceeds €6 million, or b) the 
electronic money issued is accepted as a means of payment only by the issuer’s 
subsidiaries, or c) the e-money issued is accepted only by a limited number of undertakings 
(which are within a limited local area, or in a close financial and business relationship with 
the issuer).179 In this way waived institutions could benefit from less stringent regulations, 
however, they could not utilize the single passport provision to conduct activities in other 
Member States. 
As regards the transposition of the waiver into the national legislations there was 
significant variability both in term of the criteria and process for granting a waiver, and the 
EMD provisions which can be waived.180 In the EMD Evaluation it was noted that six 
Member States had not implemented the waiver and five had implemented only some of 
the waiver criteria.181 Additionally, among those Member States who had implemented all 
criteria, eight had made changes to one or more of them or had imposed additional 
requirements.182 The process for granting a waiver differed as well, with some countries 
granting the waiver automatically if the conditions were met, while others required a 
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formal application.183 There were also wide variations as to which provisions of the E-
Money Directive were waived. For example, seven member states exempted institutions to 
which the waiver regime applied from all requirements applicable to ELMIs. The only 
requirement for such institutions usually involved reporting their activities and the amount 
of outstanding e-money liabilities to the regulators annually or semiannually.184 In five 
Member States the authorities decided on a case by case basis which provisions of the 
prudential framework were to be waived, while respecting the principle of proportionality 
and equal treatment.185 In other countries, institutions operating under a waiver had to 
comply with "certain well-defined parts of the regulatory and supervisory framework".186 
The Commission observed that there was an inconsistent application of the waiver 
regime between Member States, which could lead to competitive distortions within national 
borders. It needs to be noted that in the existence of waivers more new players had entered 
the market187 However, if the waiver rules were applied in a more consistent manner it 
would mean that the ELMI regulations would be relaxed in Member States who have a 
stricter policy toward waivers or do not utilize waivers altogether. This in turn would give 
rise to regulatory and level playing field concerns.188 The Commissions conclusion was 
that a better course of action would be to clarify the scope of the E-Money Directive and 
relax its core requirements in order to reduce the reliance on waivers. 
3.1.4.7 Prudential Framework - Recap 
Based on the aforesaid surveys it appears that all five areas of the regulatory 
framework with respect to electronic money issuers have imposed requirements and 
limitations that may have been unnecessary strict and onerous relative to the risk involved 
for the consumer and the stability of the monetary system. As mentioned previously, the 
EMD was a minimum harmonization directive and Member States had the option to impose 
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stricter regulations. In fact, in many countries regulators did not see a benefit in lesser 
regulation for e-money issuers. Further, the Directive allowed Member States with a 
traditionally restrictive regulatory policy toward e-money to maintain it, by using for 
example, waiver conditions and a broad definition of e-money.189 The differences in the 
national implementation of the Directive's provisions, with some member states instituting 
much stricter rules than required, led to a fragmentation of the market with the end result 
that there were few new entrants into the e-money market, very few issuers operating at a 
pan-European level, and in general, a low adoption rate for e-money among consumers. 
Despite its drawbacks the EMD became the foundation of e-money regulation in 
Europe. The next part of this thesis will examine the results the Directive achieved 
compared to the objectives that had been set. 
3.1.5 Objectives vs. Results 
Whether the EMD was able to achieve its objectives is a matter of opinion. In their 
Evaluation190 of the Directive the consultants concluded that "to a certain extent" most of 
the objectives were met.191 On the other hand, there were significant shortcomings with the 
regulation of electronic money and the development of the e-money market in Europe was 
lagging, which prompted an overhaul of the Directive. First and foremost the scope and 
applicability of the Directive were subject to interpretation. Moreover, there was an 
apparent disparity between the prudential requirements and the perceived risks, to which 
ELMIs and the consumers were exposed.192 
The E-money Directive had five original objectives193 delineated below.  
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3.1.5.1 Create legal certainty and thereby encourage competition and contribute to 
the development of electronic commerce. 
As regards legal certainty, the EMD did establish a regulatory framework and did 
achieve a degree of legal certainty. Nevertheless, questions remained. In particular, there 
were questions as to how that framework would apply with respect to certain schemes and 
certain issuers.194 There was not sufficient clarity whether the definition of e-money 
applied to certain account-based schemes and electronic vouchers. Further, the 
interpretation of the Directive was problematic with respect to certain issuers such as 
mobile network operators and transport providers.195 The biggest issue was the prohibition 
on activities not related to e-money issuance, which left MNOs and transport providers 
unable to provide payment services if they were classified as e-money issuers. This topic 
will be dealt with in more detail below. 
3.1.5.2 Assist electronic money in reaching its full potential and avoid hampering 
technological innovation. 
In their Final Report on the E-Money Directive the consultants have noted that it has 
remained technologically neutral, however, it is not clear to what extent the development of 
new technologies have been encouraged or hindered.196 Additionally, the Commission 
states that any uncertainties over the applicability of the legal framework come as a result 
not of the electronic device used, but of the nature of the product and the issuer.197 
Nevertheless, as already discussed previously, at the time the directive was drafted it was 
envisaged that electronic money will primarily be stored on devices in the physical 
possession of the consumer. Network solutions such as the popular payment service 
provider PayPal and payment services offered by MNOs were not foreseen, which later 
resulted in regulatory difficulties. 
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3.1.5.3 Preserve a level playing field between e-money issuers and other credit 
institutions. 
The Evaluation of the Directive has concluded that while the EMD generated 
competition between banks and ELMIs, it was very controversial whether this competition 
took place on a level playing field. There were questions in regard to the appropriate 
treatment of the prepaid services of MNOs.198 Additionally, as demonstrated above, one of 
the biggest concerns was that the prudential framework for electronic money institutions 
was too strict. It could have been difficult for small e-money issuers operating on a waiver 
to comply with the substantial initial and ongoing capital requirements in order to request a 
license and transition to full-blown ELMIs. Only institutions operating as fully licensed 
ELMIs can benefit from passporting their license to other Member States.  
3.1.5.4 Ensure the stability and soundness of e-money issuers in order to 
safeguard consumer interests. 
The Commission noted that the E-Money Directive was successful in ensuring the 
stability and soundness of e-money issuers. No cases of insolvency, fraud or harm to 
consumers were recorded.199  In light of this, there was no need to impose a stricter regime, 
and on the contrary, many stakeholders considered parts of the regulatory framework 
disproportionate to the risks arising from the activities of ELMIs. Specific areas of 
regulation that could be reconsidered were the combination of ongoing own funds 
requirements and limitations of investments, certain national interpretations of the 
restriction of activities and requirements to ensure sound and prudent operation of 
ELMIs.200 Consequently, a more risk based approach could be implemented without 
having a negative impact the adequacy of consumer protection or the stability of issuers. 
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3.1.5.5 Facilitate access by e-money issuers across Member States, contributing 
to the free movement of capital and to the freedom of cross-border 
services. 
As regards to the passporting provisions of the Directive, the Commission came to 
the conclusion that they were seen as sufficiently facilitating cross-border activity and 
provided a solid foundation for the future integration of the market. The fact that only three 
ELMIs had utilized the single passport as of the date of the report was due to the general 
state of the e-money market and not to administrative obstacles.201 Nevertheless, the 
passporting regime was seen as inferior to that applicable to credit institutions and subject 
to review. The EMD specifically exempted certain banking directive provisions from 
applying to ELMIs.202 This meant that ELMIs setting up branches in other Member States 
could be made subject to additional exemptions or capital requirements.203 
3.2 The Case of Mobile Network Operators 
Arguably, the EMD has been most controversial with regard to the national 
implementation and interpretation of its applicability to hybrid issuers.204 The term hybrid 
issuers refers to e-money schemes where the undertaking involved may issue electronic 
money but in fact its core business is unrelated to e-money issuance..205 Mobile network 
operators are a case in point. As previously discussed, the Directive attempted to be 
technologically neutral and therefore, e-money was defined in broad terms, at a time when 
network or server storage of funds was not envisaged. In the meantime, technology has 
evolved, the mobile communications sector has grown at a rapid clip206 and m-commerce 
represents an ever larger share207 of the total e-commerce volume. The total value of 
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payments via mobile phone for digital and physical goods, money transfers and near field 
communication transactions (NFC) reached $170 billion in 2010 on a worldwide basis.208  
The broadly formulated definition of electronic money in the E-Money Directive led 
some member states to impose the EMD regulatory framework on MNOs who were 
allowing customers to use the prepaid float of their accounts to purchase third party 
products or services.209 Multiple problems resulted from this.  
The first problem area was that the Directive restricted the activities of e-money 
issuers to only those activities ancillary to e-money issuance.210 Further, since only credit 
institutions or ELMIs were allowed to issue e-money211, MNOs would have to seek ELMI 
authorization. As a result, MNOs would not be able to continue to engage in their 
traditional business and namely the provision of mobile telecommunication services. As a 
stopgap measure, it was suggested by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors for 
MNOs to set up subsidiaries with the purpose of managing e-money activities.212  
Nevertheless, this was a cumbersome solution and would have subjected MNOs to liquidity 
restraints and other adverse effects.213 
A typical example of the above predicament was when the UK Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) attempted to regulate MNOs according to the EMD and required that they 
obtain authorization as e-money issuers in the year 2003.214 The companies could either 
choose to get licensed as ELMIs and quit their telephony business or conversely decide not 
seek ELMI authorization. In the end, the UK companies chose to continue business as 
usual and defied the FSA, actively disobeying the law. The FSA however, then backed 
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down and adopted a wait-and-see approach in expectation of the future review of payment 
services regulations in the EU215 in the form of the Payment Services Directive (PSD).  
The second problem area was the redeemability requirement216 as already discussed 
above. If MNOs were to be regulated as ELMIs under the E-Money Directive, prepaid 
phone credit would have to be redeemable at par value.217 It is generally accepted that 
prepaid phone credit is not redeemable and the customer cannot obtain monetary value for 
the unused portion of the credit.218 It has been argued that in order to implement 
redeemability of credit, MNOs would have to introduce a two way payment system, 
something which could jeopardize the liquidity reserves of network operators.219 Further, 
such a system would most likely be associated with increased administrative costs and lead 
to increased consumer prices, having a negative impact on the industry as a whole as well 
as its future development.220 In this line of reasoning, it would appear that the other 
elements of prudential framework applicable to ELMIs, such as capital and reserve 
requirements, limitations on investments would similarly put the MNOs' business model at 
risk. 
Due to the above-mentioned issues, the EU Commission was compelled to review the 
applicability of the EMD to mobile network operators. It launched a consultative process 
and in 2005 came out with a Guidance Note221 on the application of the Directive to mobile 
operators. The Commission observed that there was no evidence showing harm to 
consumers or to the stability of the payment system resulting from the issuance of e-money 
by MNOs.222 Further, "it would appear difficult to justify the imposition of all elements of 
the Directive (including the redeemability requirement and a limitation on investments) 
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from a ‘proportionality’ point of view".223 The Commission went on to clarify that in order 
to determine whether a hybrid institution is engaged in e-money issuance, the payment 
relationship between the customer and the third party should be analyzed. The EMD should 
apply if: a) there is a direct transfer of e-value (e.g. between mobile handsets) and b) the 
hybrid institution acts as an intermediary and there is a direct debtor-creditor relationship 
between the customer and third party merchant.224 
Despite the Commission's guidance there has been much uncertainty and controversy 
over the application of the E-Money Directive to MNOs at the national level. Some 
Member States (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and UK) followed the EC 
Guidance Note and adopted the principle that the EMD did not apply if there was no direct 
debtor-creditor relationship between the customer and third party merchant.225 Other 
Member States (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal) reported that the 
situation was unclear and they were not applying the EMD to MNOs while awaiting further 
guidance. All MNOs in Austria were regulated under the banking directives because they 
had obtained banking licenses and therefore the EMD did not apply.226 Belgian authorities 
did not follow the EC Guidance Note and held that all prepaid schemes should be 
considered e-money. No hybrid e-money issuers existed at the time in Belgium and the 
Belgian regulators expected further clarification.227 Obviously these national differences 
had a negative effect on the single market for e-payments and the legislative framework 
was in great need of clarification. The situation was resolved with the enactment of the 
Payment Services Directive (PSD), which will be addressed later on in the paper. 
3.3 Comment on PayPal 
As already discussed in Section 2.3.3 PayPal is often put forward as an example of a 
successful e-money issuer on a worldwide basis. The company stands out as the single e-
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money issuer that has attained a substantial EU-wide market228 up until now. Yet, PayPal's 
story in Europe is indicative of the shortcomings of the original E-Money Directive. I 
would argue that the success of PayPal in the EU is not due to the regulatory environment 
as framed by the Directive, but in spite of it. With PayPal's fortunes being largely tied to 
the captive online auction market of eBay and its success229, the company has been able to 
adapt to the regulatory framework of multiple jurisdictions. 
After the adoption of the original E-Money Directive in Europe, a question arose as to 
the status of account-based schemes such as PayPal.230 Namely it was debatable whether 
PayPal should be considered an electronic money institution for the purposes of the 
directive. This is because it can be argued that PayPal does not issue money as stipulated in 
the e-money definition of the Directive, instead money is withdrawn from a PayPal user's 
credit card or bank account and is then stored in the user's PayPal account. In this way 
PayPal resembles more closely a credit institution, not an e-money institution and should 
be subject to a different regulatory regime.231 
Despite the questions and uncertainty generated by the wording of the EMD, PayPal 
requested to be registered an electronic money institution in June 2003, and received its 
accreditation from the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK in February 2004.232 
One of the E-Money Directive's objectives was "to preserve a level playing field between 
electronic money institutions and other credit institutions issuing electronic money" for the 
benefit of consumers.233 This was to be attained by constructing a lighter regulatory regime 
on ELMIs compared to that applicable to traditional credit institutions, counterbalancing it 
with several restrictions not imposed on banks.234 It has been argued in this paper that even 
the lighter regulatory regime has been unnecessarily strict in proportion to the risk involved 
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in relation to e-money issuance. Further, it has been suggested by some commentators that 
the restrictions on ELMIs, and namely the requirement to maintain a float equal to 100% of 
the value of e-money issued and outstanding, the requirement to invest the float in only the 
safest securities (generally those with the lowest return) and the restriction on extraneous 
business activities235 have all contributed to making the issuing of e-money only 
marginally profitable.236  
The above compounded with the differing interpretations of the E-Money Directive in 
the national legislations of the EU countries and the patchwork of rules and regulations 
throughout Europe can make it difficult to determine which regulatory regime - the one 
applicable to banks or the one applicable to ELMIs - is more attractive. A telling fact may 
be that effective July 2007, PayPal was granted authorization as a Luxembourg credit 
institution and in this way avoided the regulatory regime of the E-Money Directive237 or 
rather traded the regulations applicable to ELMIs for those applicable to banks. 
Nevertheless, PayPal chooses to maintain its status as an e-money issuer and §1.1 of 
its user agreement for Europe238 states the following:  
 
PayPal is only a Payment Service Provider. … PayPal’s main business is the issuance of E-
money and the provision of services closely related to the issuance of E-money. … Since the 
service is limited to E-money, which does not qualify as a deposit or an investment service in 
the sense of the Law, you are not protected by the Luxembourg deposit guarantee schemes 
provided by the Association pour la Garantie des Dépôts Luxembourg (AGDL).239 
 
By contrast, in the US for example there are no special restrictions or regulations with 
regard to e-money240, and §1.1 of PayPal's US user agreement241 reads: 
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 PayPal is Only a Payment Service Provider. PayPal helps you make payments to and accept 
payments from third parties. PayPal is an independent contractor for all purposes, except that 
PayPal acts as your agent with respect to the custody of your funds only."  
 
§5.1 continues: 
 
If you do hold a Balance, PayPal will hold your funds separate from its corporate funds, will 
not use your funds for its operating expenses or any other corporate purposes and will not 
voluntarily make your funds available to its creditors in the event of bankruptcy.242 
 
In multiple other jurisdictions, including Japan, PayPal operates as a stored-value 
facility under Singapore law. §1.1 of the user agreement243 applicable to those jurisdictions 
states:  
 
PayPal acts as a facilitator to help customers accept payments and to help customers make 
payments. … PayPal will at all times hold your funds separate from its corporate funds, will 
not use your funds for its operating expenses or any other corporate purposes, and will not 
voluntarily make funds available to its creditors in the event of bankruptcy or for any other 
purpose. You acknowledge that (i) PayPal is not a bank and the Service is a payment 
processing service rather than a banking service, and (ii) PayPal is not acting as a trustee, 
fiduciary or escrow with respect to your funds, but is acting only as an agent and custodian.244 
 
From the differences between the user agreements mentioned above it is obvious that 
a company such as PayPal clearly adapts to the regulatory environment it operates in. In the 
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EU it is an e-money issuer, in the USA it is an agent and independent contractor, and in 
other jurisdictions such as Japan it is a facilitator as well as an agent and custodian. These 
differences are despite the fact that PayPal uses the same underlying technology and 
provides the same type of account-based service.245 While in Europe PayPal users 
exchange real world money for electronic money, it appears that users in the US and Japan 
maintain ownership of their real money funds, while PayPal acts as an agent for them.246 
It has been discussed in this thesis that the stricter regulatory regime in Europe 
relative to e-money has arguably had a negative impact on small and start-up electronic 
money issuers. One of the reasons for the implementation of this regime was consumer 
protection and one would think that consumers in Europe would be better protected than 
those in other jurisdictions. There have been arguments to the contrary, however. It has 
been pointed out that in the event of a PayPal bankruptcy, users in Europe will only have a 
claim against the bankrupt company's estate.247 PayPal specifically warns its EU users that 
their funds are not insured by deposit insurance.248 On the other hand, in the user 
agreements applicable to the US and Japan, PayPal only acts as agent and the consumers 
presumably maintain ownership of their funds. In the event of bankruptcy, consumer funds, 
which are to be held separate by virtue of those agreements, will most likely remain outside 
the bankrupt estate.249 Further, if a bank where PayPal holds user funds were to become 
insolvent, users in the US and other jurisdiction could be eligible for pass-through deposit 
insurance, which would not be the case in Europe, where PayPal is considered the sole 
owner of such funds.250 
Another disadvantage to consumers in Europe is the minimum threshold for 
redemption of e-funds. In accordance with the E-Money Directive that is set to €10 or £6 
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by §6.2 of PayPal's EU user agreement. No such minimum redemption requirement exists 
in the agreements applicable to the US and Japan.251 
PayPal's case in Europe highlights some important issues with the original E-Money 
Directive. First, due the Directive's ambiguity, it was uncertain whether PayPal would fall 
under the Directive's scope or should be treated as a deposit-taking institution. Second, the 
EMD arguably imposed prudential rules on ELMIs that could be regarded as too strict in 
proportion to the risks. Further, the national implementation of those rules differed widely 
and this could be a reason why PayPal chose to abandon its status as an ELMI and seek 
authorization as a Luxembourg credit institution. Lastly, despite the Directive's aim to 
ensure better consumer protection, consumers in other, less regulated jurisdictions may be 
better protected than EU consumers. Overall, according to this author's opinion, the 
original Electronic Money Directive did in effect put the cart before the horse. It set the 
stage for a regulatory patchwork of rules that proved too stringent to allow the nascent e-
money industry to develop as originally envisioned. 
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4 Regulatory Environment in Japan 
This chapter discusses the main features of the legal framework in Japan. The 
Japanese framework was set up primarily by the Prepaid Card Law which is analyzed in the 
first section of the chapter. The second section reviews the reasons why the original law 
was repealed and introduces the Law on the Settlement of Funds into which the Prepaid 
Card Law was incorporated. The third and final section of the chapter compares regulatory 
regime of Japan with that of the European Union. 
4.1 Prepaid Card Law 
Since 1989 the Prepaid Card Law252 in Japan has provided a flexible enough legal 
background to make the growth of electronic money possible.253 Many laws regulate the 
different facets of stored-value cards in Japan, e.g. the contractual or criminal aspects 
associated with their use.254 A large part of the regulatory framework, however, is shaped 
by the Prepaid Card Law since, by definition, stored-value cards are positioned outside the 
scope of most banking laws.255 The goals of the Prepaid Card Law are "to regulate the 
issuance of prepaid vouchers, protect the funds of voucher holders, and improve the 
trustworthiness of prepaid vouchers".256 These are somewhat reminiscent of the drivers 
behind the adoption of the original E-Money Directive in the EU. The Prepaid Card Law 
defined vouchers as tangible items on which "value is recorded for the purpose of 
effectuating payment for goods and services with counterparties defined by contract".257 In 
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this way, not all forms of electronic money came under scope of law. Moreover, certain 
types of vouchers were excluded such as those issued by the government or vouchers used 
in complex financial transactions.258 
As mentioned previously, non-banks in Japan were allowed to participate in certain 
financial activities. In fact, under the Prepaid Card Law, any entity or person can issue 
prepaid vouchers as long as the registration and prudential requirements were satisfied.259 
In order for the registration requirements to be met, the issuing entity must provide 
information on its name, its stock capitalization, the name of the directors, and the type of 
vouchers to be issued.260 In contrast to the original EU E-Money Directive, the Prepaid 
Card Law contains no redeemability requirements261, i.e. an obligation for issuers to refund 
prepaid funds upon request, nor does it restrict the types of business activities262 an e-
money issuer can engage in.263 
The principal prudential requirement under the Prepaid Card Law for stored-value 
card issuers is to maintain, at minimum, a balance of fifty percent of the value of all 
vouchers issued as a security deposit. Further, the security deposit may only be invested in 
low risk securities such as government bonds or other secure investments.264 The prepaid 
card law does not discriminate among different types of institutions and applies in the same 
manner to banks and non-bank issuers alike.265  The law does not differentiate between 
small and large institutions either.266 The capital requirements do not appear burdensome in 
any way. There is no strict initial capital obligation that may prevent issuers from getting 
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started in the business. The required deposit is proportional to the amount of funds issued 
and grows at the same rate as the issuing company's voucher business. 
In the realm of consumer protection, prepaid card holders are guaranteed to receive at 
least a portion of their outstanding funds balance in the event the issuer becomes insolvent. 
This is due to the fifty percent security deposit requirement and also to the fact that voucher 
holders have priority with regard to the security deposit over all other creditors.267 
In other words, the Prepaid Card Law supplied the legal framework necessary to 
facilitate the growth of electronic money in Japan. It provided flexibility and did not burden 
electronic funds issuers with excessive regulations. On the other hand, the law ensured a 
certain degree of consumer protection and regulatory oversight. 
4.2 Law on the Settlement of Funds 
The Prepaid Card Law, however, was starting to become inadequate due to the fact 
that technology had changed significantly since the law's adoption in 1989. This led to the 
Prepaid Card Law being repealed and replaced after being on the books for twenty years. 
The Law on the Settlement of Funds268 adopted in 2009 took its place.269 The provisions of 
the Prepaid Card Law were for the most part incorporated into the new law, which also had 
a wider scope. The new law provides the regulatory framework for prepayment methods 
(i.e. electronic money), fund transfer services as well as inter-bank fund settlements.270 
As already mentioned, the Prepaid Card Law regulated prepaid vouchers, or 
electronic (and non-electronic) funds in the form of physical items such as certificates or 
cards. The value, a certain prepaid amount, would be recorded and tracked on the voucher 
itself.271 There emerged, however, a second type of prepayment method that remained 
outside the law's scope. With the progress of technology and communications it became 
possible to employ server-type prepayments, where the prepaid value is stored remotely on 
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a server payments for goods and services can be made for example through internet 
websites.272 Since the prepayment amount is registered only on servers, users make 
payments by accessing the servers through telecommunication lines.273 
This latter type of prepaid method had largely remained outside the reach of the 
existing regulatory framework. While this gave businesses free reign, consumer safety 
concerns had been growing.274 Another issue was that when funds were stored on 
centralized servers, the prepaid vouchers could be regarded as less voucher-like and more 
approximating bank deposits.275 Some have argued that, therefore, bank regulation may be 
more suitable than the Prepaid Card Law, which, for instance, did not address the scenario 
of a server failure and the potential loss of account information.276 Similar questions and 
concerns arose in Europe, where for example, PayPal's status as an e-money issuer was 
questioned, with the argument that it should be treated as a deposit taking institution 
instead.277 
The Japanese Prepaid Card Law was replaced because payment technologies 
developed farther than what was envisaged in the law itself. The Prepaid Card Law became 
a part of the Law on the Settlement of Funds, which covered both types of prepayment 
systems. Whereas the new law principally maintains the regulations previously in place, 
some additional regulations were imposed, for example prepaid funds issuers are obligated 
to issue refunds to customer in the event their businesses were to close.278 Nevertheless, the 
flexibility and simplicity of the previous legal framework remained while the new 
technologies were taken into consideration. Thus, Japan continues to be a country poised to 
undergo sustained growth of its e-money market. 
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4.3 Comparison with the EU 
When compared with the European legal framework, the prudential regime in Japan 
appears concise, clear and straightforward. The E-Money Directive in the EU established 
complex prudential rules, which proved much too stringent for the emergent e-money 
industry in Europe. Moreover, the wording of the Directive created uncertainties and 
differences of interpretation, which further hampered the development of e-money. One of 
the issues was that the Directive attempted to stay technologically neutral, which in fact 
created ambiguity of with regard to its scope. On the other hand, the Japanese law clearly 
regulated a certain payment technology (prepaid vouchers)279 while providing a simple 
easily followed prudential framework at the same time. The legislative intent always 
remained clear-cut. 
 While changes in technology eventually became a reason for concern and resulted in 
the recent revamping of the Prepaid Card Law, the law had successfully provided the 
regulatory framework for 20 years. It did so by allowing any person or entity to issue 
prepaid vouchers280 and by only regulating the activity of issuance. Thus, Japan avoided 
the need to establish a complex prudential regime for different types of institutions. By 
contrast, the EMD set up three separate sets of regulations for e-money issuance by banks, 
ELMIs and waived institutions. Unless Member States allowed e-money issuers to operate 
under a waiver, capital requirements were stringent. In Japan there are no initial capital 
requirements,281 allowing anyone to become involved in the issuance of prepaid vouchers. 
Financial stability and consumer protection are ensured by the obligation maintain a 
security deposit of at least half the value of all vouchers issued. In this way, the obligation 
did not represent a greater burden for smaller issuers. Lastly, the Japanese law contains no 
redeemability requirements.282 Such requirements were introduced by the E-Money 
Directive and have been controversial, especially with regard to MNOs.  
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5 Recent Legislative Developments in the EU 
This chapter of the thesis will look at recent legislative initiatives in the EU and their 
impact on the state of the electronic money market. The first such initiative to be addressed 
is the Payment Services Directive, which deals with payment services in general but also 
pertains to e-money payments as well. The chapter then continues with an analysis of the 
new E-Money Directive in an attempt to explore to what extent it corrects the shortcomings 
of the original directive as well as to assess the future of electronic money in Europe. 
5.1 Payment Services Directive 
When the Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the E-Money 
Directive came out in 2006, the adoption of the Payment Services Directive (PSD) was 
considered. The Commission commented on the close interrelationship between e-money 
and electronic payments and also maintained that any regulatory changes with regard to 
ELMIs would have to be coordinated with the PSD.283 It was vital "to ensure a seamless 
consistency between the respective regimes for payment institutions and ELMIs".284 
Hence, the role the Payment Services Directive plays in shaping the regulatory framework 
for e-money is analyzed next. 
5.1.1 Background 
EC Directive 2007/64 on payment services was an important milestone because it set 
out to "make cross-border payments as easy, efficient and secure as 'national' payments 
within a Member State".285  In so doing, attention was directed to electronic payments as an 
alternative to cash with the concurrent goals of increasing consumer confidence in this area 
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as well as fostering trade.286 Besides cost and inconvenience to consumers, the EU 
Commission had estimated that the yearly cost of making cross-border payments among 
the member states amounted to 2-3 percent of EU GDP.287  
The PSD is part of the “New Legal Framework for Payments in the Internal 
Market”288 initiative to harmonize the legal rules for payment services in EU member 
states.289 The Directive has two main objectives: a) to promote competition in the market 
for payment services by eliminating barriers to entry and ensuring equality of treatment 
with regard to market access, and b) to create a harmonized and simplified legal framework 
for payment services in relation to information requirements and the rights and obligations 
of payment services users and providers.290 
5.1.2 A New Authorization Regime 
The Payment Services Directive establishes a new definition and an authorization 
regime for “payment institutions”291 as opposed to banks and electronic money issuers, 
which are not within its scope.292 The objective is to level the playing field in the payments 
services market between banks and non-banks.293 The authorization and registration 
requirements with regard to the provision of payment services apply across the EEA, in any 
currency.294 Certain qualitative and quantitative requirements must be met.295 For example, 
there is an initial and ongoing capital requirement of €125,000.296 This contrasts with a 
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capital requirement of €5 million for a credit institution.297 The difference is primarily 
because a payment institution cannot accept deposits and can only issue credit in certain 
instances298, but concomitantly, the relaxed requirements should make the payment 
services market more accessible to new entrants. Consumers are protected, however, due to 
the obligation that a payment institution engaging in other business activities cannot 
commingle the funds received from payment service users with its own funds.299 Member 
states may waive all or a portion of the authorization requirements for small payment 
institutions300 that do not wish to conduct business in other member state or “passport” 
their authorization.301 Furthermore, the PSD sets out harmonized rules on the information 
payment institutions must provide to their customers as well as on liability.302 
The Payment Services Directive attempted to resolve some of the issues facing 
mobile network operators as a result of the original E-Money Directive. Now MNOs had 
the option to provide payment services if they obtained a license as a "payment institution".  
Furthermore, MNOs only fell within the scope of the PSD if they acted solely as 
intermediary between the user and the supplier in making the payment.303 If the payment 
service is dependent on the provision of other digital services supplied by the 
telecommunications provider (e.g. sale of ring tones, digital newspapers, etc.), where the 
provider adds intrinsic value, the Directive does not apply. 
5.1.3 Regulatory Framework for Payment Services  
The rights and obligations of payment service providers and users are addressed in 
the PSD. These rules are applicable to all payment service providers, including e-money 
issuers.304 Some of the more noteworthy elements addressed in the applicable section of the 
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Directive305 are consent, irrevocability, execution time, liability in the event of 
unauthorized use, and liability in the event of non-execution or defective execution. 
Consent must be given by the payer for a payment transaction to be considered 
authorized.306 If consent has not been given for a transaction it is to be regarded as 
unauthorized.307 Further, the payer can withdraw his consent at any time, but not after a 
transaction has become irrevocable.308 The irrevocability (or finality) of payments is 
especially important in payment and payment settlement systems.309 Therefore, the PSD 
stipulates that a payment services user cannot normally revoke a payment order after it has 
been received by the payer’s payment services provider.310 
With respect to the execution time, the Directive speeds up the time for processing of 
cross-border transactions. By 2012, processing of payment transactions should be carried 
out within one working day. After the receipt of a payment order, the payer’s payment 
services provider will be required to have credited the payee’s provider account by the end 
of the next business day.311 Additionally, the funds should be credited to the payee’s 
account on the same business day that the payee’s payment services provider receives 
them.312 
The PSD champions the interest of consumers by providing common rules with 
regard to liability as well. End users do have the obligation to abide by the terms of use of a 
given payment instrument and are also required to keep its security features safe and to 
notify their payment institution without undue delay in the event of loss or misuse.313 On 
the other hand, the liability lies with the payment services provider if an unauthorized 
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transaction takes place, and the user’s account should be restored to its original state.314 If 
the unauthorized transaction(s) is a result of a lost or stolen payment instrument, or 
compromised security features, the end-user is liable only up to €150.315 Further, the end-
user has no liability for transactions that have taken place after he has notified the payment 
services provider about the loss of theft of the payment instrument, unless the user has 
acted fraudulently.316 In the event of non-executed or defective transactions, the payer’s 
payment services provider is liable to the payer, unless he can prove that the transaction 
was executed correctly. In such a case, the payee’s payment provider will be liable.317 
5.1.4 Payment Services Directive - Recap 
The PSD was meant as a full harmonization directive and as such it was an important 
step toward a unified financial services market in Europe. It makes possible the provision 
of uniform payment instruments throughout the EU.318 Further, the payment services 
directive has been central to the development of SEPA319 (Single Euro Payments Area), 
which has been dealing with creating uniform technical standards and processes with 
regard to credit transfers, direct debits and card payments.  
The Directive streamlines and unifies the EU's national payment regimes and together 
with Regulation 924/2009 on cross-border payments makes a concerted effort to minimize 
the cost of cross-border transactions and to foster competition between banks, credit card 
companies and other payment providers.320 It is debatable, however, how effective the 
Directive has been with regard to opening the market for payment services and increasing 
competition by creating an authorization regime for non-bank "payment institutions"/321 
Nevertheless, the PSD introduced has important rules and consumer protection provisions 
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that benefit users of miscellaneous payment services, e-money included. This makes it 
difficult to determine the impact of the Directive on electronic money take-up by 
consumers. On the one hand, consumer protection in the area of electronic payments 
(including e-money) has been strengthened. On the other hand, the cost effectiveness and 
general appeal of other competing payment methods have also been increased. Therefore, it 
may be up to the new E-Money Directive to shape the future of electronic money in 
Europe. That Directive will be discussed in the next section of this thesis. 
5.2 New Electronic Money Directive 
As discussed previously in this paper, there was a general dissatisfaction with the 
original E-Money Directive and the development of the electronic market in Europe. There 
were few fully licensed e-money issuers in Europe and the volume of outstanding e-money 
in circulation was fairly low.322 The subsequent review of the Directive led to the proposal 
and adoption of a new Directive on Electronic Money, EC Directive 2009/110. The 
deadline for implementation of the new E-Money Directive by the Member States is April 
30, 2011.323 From that date the original E-Money Directive is effectively repealed and 
replaced by the new Directive.324 The shortcomings of the original directive, as seen by the 
Commission, have been addressed in the new EMD. Some of the main aspects of the 
changes to the e-money regulatory framework are addressed below. 
5.2.1 Updated Definitions 
The new directive amends the definition of e-money:  
 
'Electronic money' means electronically, including magnetically, stored monetary value as 
represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued on receipt of funds for the purpose of 
making payment transactions … , and which is accepted by a natural or legal person other 
than the electronic money issuer.325 
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 The new definition removes the reference to e-money being stored on 'electronic 
device', in order to relieve the ambiguity of the old definition. Server or network based e-
money is now clearly within the scope of the Directive. The above definition is further 
strengthened by Recital 8326 which leaves no doubt that e-money can be placed on both 
electronic devices and server storage. Moreover, the scope of the definition is broadened 
since e-money technologies can now include magnetic (non-smart) cards (e.g. reusable gift 
cards).327 An additional element is that the new EMD is now coordinated with the Payment 
Services Directive and e-money is issued 'for the purpose of making payment transactions' 
as defined in the PSD.328  
With regard to exclusions from the scope of the Directive, certain loyalty schemes 
and reward programs will continue to fall outside the definition of e-money due to the 
ongoing requirement that electronic money has to be issued on the 'receipt of funds', i.e. it 
cannot be issued for free.329 Recital 5, however, exhibits a new approach to prepaid 
instruments that are meant to be used in a 'limited way' e.g. "within a limited network of 
service providers" or for "a limited range of goods and services". In such situations the 
Directive will not be applicable.330 This differs from the original EMD where the 
acceptance of electronic money "by a limited number of undertakings" only made the 
issuing institution eligible for a waiver.331 In this way the new EMD is once more brought 
in sync with the PSD, because the PSD does not apply to "services based on instruments 
that can be used … within  a limited network of service providers or for a limited range of 
goods and services".332 
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With regard to the definition of ELMIs, it has also been made clearer and more 
concise. An 'electronic money institution' is defined as a legal person that has been granted 
authorization under the EMD to issue electronic money.333 This, combined with the fact 
that the new EMD is a 'full harmonization' directive should leave no ambiguity that ELMIs 
are subject to their own prudential framework, a framework that is distinct from that of 
credit institutions. This had been an issue with the original E-Money Directive.334 
5.2.2 Changed Prudential Framework 
The general prudential framework for electronic money institutions imposed by the 
new EMD is another area that has been synchronized with the Payment Services Directive. 
Given that both directives are based on full harmonization, much less variability in the 
national implementations should result. This had been an issue in the implementation of the 
original EMD.335 Some of the specific features of the prudential regime applicable to 
ELMIs are addressed below. 
5.2.2.1 Limitations on Activities 
One of the main points of contention with the original E-Money Directive was that it 
restricted the business activities of ELMIs to e-money issuance and closely related 
activities. This restriction was especially problematic with the so-called hybrid issuers such 
as Mobile Network Operators and transportation companies, whose primary business was 
not e-money issuance. The limitation on activities is now effectively lifted. ELMIs can now 
also provide payment services as defined in the Payment Services Directive,336 and can 
further engage other business activities (unrelated to e-money issuance), having regard, 
however, to the 'applicable Community and national law'.337 It is anticipated that the lifting 
of these restrictions would lower the cost of entry into the e-money market for new 
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participants, by permitting them to engage in e-money issuance parallel to their core 
business.338 
5.2.2.2 Capital and Reserve Requirements 
The new EMD has taken into consideration the concerns that were voiced with regard 
to the initial capital and reserve requirements being too strict and not in proportion with the 
risks involved in e-money issuance. In the view of the Commission higher initial capital 
requirements presented a hurdle for smaller institutions operating under a waiver to obtain 
full ELMI authorization.339 As a result, the initial capital requirement and is reduced from 
€1 million to €350 000.340 This is also the minimum required own funds on an ongoing 
basis. This amount, however, is higher than the initial capital requirement for authorization 
of payment institutions under the Payment Services Directive, which sets the requirement 
at €125 000.341 
The new E-Money Directive maintains the obligation for ELMIs to have own funds 
equal to at least 2% of the average outstanding electronic money.342 This obligation 
pertains only for the activity of issuing e-money. The own funds requirement for the 
provision of payment services not linked to e-money issuance is in accordance with the 
PSD and is calculated based on the methods prescribed by it. 
5.2.2.3 Limitations on Investments 
This time around the limitations on investments or 'safeguarding requirement' as they 
are called in the new EMD are brought in sync with the Payment Services Directive. This 
means that funds received in return for e-money issued shall not be commingled with the 
funds of persons other than payment service users or e-money holders.343 Consumers are 
given better protection since such funds should be insulated in the interest of payment 
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service users against the claims other creditors, particularly in the event of insolvency.344 
ELMIs are given additional flexibility because as an alternative to maintaining float equal 
to 100% of outstanding e-money issued, they can chose to be covered by insurance which 
would be payable in the event an ELMI is unable to meet its financial obligations.345 When 
float is maintained, low risk assets should be used,346 in keeping with the original EMD. 
5.2.2.4 Redeemability 
The new EMD maintains the requirement that e-money should be redeemable at any 
time, and at par value, at the request of the e-money holder.347 The Directive permits 
issuers to charge a fee for redemption in certain instances, if stated in the contract between 
the issuer and the e-money holder and providing that such fees are 'proportionate and 
commensurate with the actual cost incurred by the electronic money issuer'.348 This 
wording gives issuers a little more leeway for charging fees, compared to the original 
EMD. In the interest of consumers, the new Directive eliminates the minimum redemption 
threshold of €10 stipulated by the original EMD. 
Concerns still remain that the redeemability requirement could pose problems for 
MNOs. Recital 6 of the new EMD would exclude MNOs from the scope of the Directive 
where "there is neither a direct payment relationship nor a direct debtor-creditor 
relationship between the network subscriber and any third-party supplier". Nevertheless, 
redeemability may impede future business models that could be adopted by MNOs.349 The 
Mobile Broadcasting Group has conveyed its apprehension that the redeemability 
requirements "could be interpreted as an obligation to redeem all funds held on mobile pre-
paid accounts with an e-money functionality".350 There has been no legislative solution to 
this problem so far.351 
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5.2.2.5 Waiver Regime 
It has been stated that the waiver regime under the original EMD has contributed to 
the growth and innovation in the e-money market. This is because businesses unable to 
obtain full ELMI authorization were allowed to enter the market and test their innovative 
ideas.352 The new E-Money Directive simplifies the waiver criteria by removing certain 
schemes from the scope of the Directive.353 To be eligible for a waiver, an issuer's total 
outstanding e-money volume should not exceed a limit set by the Member State that is no 
greater than €5 million.354 Additionally, the persons responsible for the management and 
operation of the issuer cannot have prior convictions for money laundering, terrorist 
financing or other financial crimes.355 Member states can also impose an optional 
requirement of a maximum storage amount on the payment instrument or account.356 A 
maximum storage amount not exceeding €150 was mandatory under the original EMD for 
obtaining a waiver.357 In general, the waiver regime will continue to allow smaller 
innovative institutions to operate at the national level and encourage the emergence of new 
pilot schemes. Moreover, certain 'limited' in scope schemes should be able to operate 
outside the Directive regulatory reach. 
5.3 What Does the Future Hold for E-Money in Europe? 
The new Electronic Money Directive goes a long way in reducing the burdens for 
current and future e-money issuers in Europe. In coordination with the Payment Services 
Directive it puts the European Union on the road to a unified e-money market with fewer 
differences between Member States. Yet, the actual effect of the new EMD on e-money 
issuers and the growth of electronic money as a payment medium remains to be seen after 
the Directive formally replaces the original EMD on April 30, 2011. 
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While it is difficult to predict what the future holds, the new Directive attempts to 
correct, as discussed above, many of the reasons why the original EMD was viewed as 
unsuccessful - and namely, the vague definition of its scope and applicability, prudential 
rules that were overly strict and complex, differing national implementations inhibiting the 
development of a single EU e-money market. Most notably, the reduced capital 
requirements and the lifting of the restriction on activities are likely to have a strong 
positive impact on e-money issuers. 
Nevertheless, the European legal framework remains relatively complex with regard 
to electronic money. Issuers continue to be regulated based on a three-tiered system 
differentiating between fully licensed credit institutions, ELMIs and e-money issuers 
operating under a waiver. Certain aspects of the regulations applicable to credit institutions 
under the banking directives358 remain applicable to ELMIs. The new E-Money Directive 
contains multiple references to the banking directives. While reduced, initial capital 
requirements remain in place. Redeemability of e-money at the request of the holder is still 
mandated, which is point of contention, especially with regard to MNOs.  
By contrast, the Japanese regulatory system chooses to classify prepaid instruments 
as vouchers that generally fall outside the scope of most banking regulations.359 There is no 
initial capital requirement in Japan, where any person or institution can issue stored-value 
vouchers, provided security guarantees are met.360 Furthermore, the security guarantees or 
security deposit are less burdensome than the European capital requirements since it should 
only be equal to 50% of the amount of outstanding stored-value instruments. Finally, the 
Japanese laws contain no obligation to redeem vouchers for cash.361 
It appears that despite the fact that the new EMD liberalizes and simplifies the e-
money regulatory framework in Europe, the Japanese system remains simpler and more 
liberal. Time will tell whether the recent legislative efforts in the EU would prove 
successful. The EU Commission should closely monitor the state of the e-money market to 
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ensure that the regulatory framework is not stifling growth and innovation. This is 
particularly important with regard to mobile network operators and e-money redeemability 
requirements. 
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that electronic money can be a valuable means of 
payment with distinct advantages. It has gained popularity and widespread adoption in 
some countries such as Japan. At the same, e-money has lagged as a payment method in the 
European Union. 
Different dynamics are at play when it comes to the question whether e-money will 
succeed or fail in a given jurisdiction. For example, Japan's payment culture, where cash 
payments are widespread and debit cards have limited popularity, has been conducive to 
expanded e-money usage. In the European Union, debit cards are commonly used and 
consumers have had little incentive to switch to a payment method such as e-money. 
Technology is another determining factor. The early adoption of contactless payment 
technologies may have been key to the success of e-money in Japan. Such technologies 
have yet to be deployed on a large scale in Europe. A solid business model is also critical to 
successful e-money issuance. Symbiotic business strategies where e-money supplements 
another business activity have been shown to work. Examples for this are the success of 
PayPal as an e-money issuer (in partnership with eBay) and the conversion of the train fare 
card in Japan into a payment instrument enjoying widespread use. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether stand-alone e-money schemes can be equally as successful. 
Any business model is also highly dependent on the legislative framework in which it 
operates. The rules and regulations applicable to a business activity can provide the 
stability, certainty and consumer confidence that are so conducive to its success. On the 
other hand, any regulation is associated with certain overheads, costs and regulatory 
hurdles. This thesis has shown that the original E-Money Directive in the EU achieved a 
degree of legal certainty but at the same time impeded market entry and restrained growth. 
This was due to the complex and stringent prudential framework it introduced, 
differentiating between banks, e-money issuers (ELMIs) and waived institutions. A 
restriction was imposed on ELMIs to engage in business activities extraneous to e-money. 
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Further, strict initial capital and reserve requirements stipulate that ELMIs should have not 
less than €1 million of own initial capital. Issuers have to maintain a 100% float equal to all 
electronic money issued. The float can only be invested in liquid, low risk assets. The 
Directive introduced a redeemability requirement as well, stating that e-money must be 
redeemable at all times, free of charges other than those strictly necessary to carry out the 
operation. The redeemability requirement proved controversial especially with regard to 
mobile network operators (MNOs). This thesis has argued that these and other rules 
contained in the EMD have made it difficult for e-money issuers to be profitable or even to 
become involved in e-money issuing activity. Moreover, the Directive's wording with 
regard to its scope and the definition of e-money led to ambiguities and different 
interpretation. This coupled with the fact that the EMD was based on minimum 
harmonization led to varying national implementations, hardly facilitating a single 
European market for e-money services. 
By contrast, the legal environment in Japan, as framed by the Prepaid Card Law is 
simple and straightforward and allows any person or entity to issue prepaid payment 
instruments as long as registration requirements were met. The Prepaid Card Law does not 
restrict the business activities an issuer can engage in. Further, it contains no initial capital 
requirements and no obligation to redeem prepaid funds at any time. Issuers must maintain 
a security deposit equal to 50% of the amount of prepaid funds issued. The law had a 
clearly defined scope that did not include server-type prepayments. Technology had 
changed, and so did the law - the Prepaid Card Law was incorporated into the Law on the 
Settlement of Funds, while maintaining the same basic terms but regulating server-type 
prepayments as well. Based on the facts laid out in this paper, it appears that the regulatory 
environment did indeed facilitate the growth and widespread usage of electronic money in 
Japan.  
The recent legislative efforts in Europe - the Payment Services Directive and the new 
E-Money Directive - have attempted to establish a more streamlined legislative framework 
with lower regulatory barriers. The changes include a new definition of e-money, which is 
brought in line with technological developments. The capital and reserve requirements are 
relaxed reducing the initial capital needed to €350 000. The restriction on business 
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activities is lifted. The new directives strengthen consumer protection and address some of 
the issues facing mobile network operators. Yet, despite these changes, the European 
regulatory system remains stricter and more complex than the Japanese. Therefore, in order 
for electronic money to be successful in Europe, legislators need to remain watchful of the 
impact the regulatory framework has on the e-money market, further relaxing the 
prudential regime if needed.  
Yet, regulation by itself would not be able alter the course of the e-money industry. A 
concerted effort will be needed by market participants, along with significant investments, 
to provide the appropriate technological solutions and to change consumer perceptions and 
behaviors. 
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